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INTRODUCTION OF THE VOTER CONFIDENCE AND INCREASED ACCESSIBILITY ACT OF 2003
-- HON. RUSH D. HOLT (Extensions of Remarks - May 23, 2003)
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---
HON. RUSH D. HOLT
OF NEW JERSEY
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2003
- Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing The Voter Confidence and
Increased Accessibility Act of 2003.
- After the Florida voting debacle of the 2000 election, we in Congress
recognized that we had to act to restore the integrity and reliability of our
electoral system by making dimpled chads and other voting irregularities a
thing of the past. Last October, we enacted the Help America Vote Act (HAVA),
groundbreaking election reform legislation that is currently helping states
throughout the country replace antiquated and unreliable punch cards and
butterfly ballots. Early this month, the newly-formed New Jersey HAVA
Commission held it's first meeting. From those Commissioners and others I
know, there is a great deal of enthusiasm about the increased Federal
involvement in oversight, funding and guidance with respect to the conduct of
elections for Federal office.
- But HAVA could have an adverse, unintended consequence. It is fueling a
headlong rush by states and localities to purchase computer voting systems
that suffer from a serious flaw. It generates suspicion about the voting. You,
the voter, have no way of knowing if your vote is recorded as you intended.
- Imagine it's Election Day 2004. You enter your local polling place and
cast your vote on a brand new ``touch screen'' voting machine. The screen is
large and well lit, and your choices are clearly spelled out before you. In
fact, it looks as easy to use as the ATM at your bank. You breathe a sigh of
relief that you no longer have to figure out a complicated butterfly ballot or
pull a lever. So you make a choice and touch the corresponding button to cast
your vote. The screen says your vote has been counted. As you exit the voting
booth, however, you begin to wonder: how do I know if the machine actually
recorded my vote correctly. The fact is, you don't. No one knows.
- That is why hundreds of nationally-renowned computer scientists, including
David Dill of Stanford University, consider a voter-verified paper trail to be
a critical safeguard for the accuracy, integrity and security of
computer-assisted elections.
- Without a physical record of votes cast, how will election officials in
2004 be able to launch an effective, honest recount in a closely contested
election? How will they be able to ensure that a computer hacker has not
tampered with votes?
- Dr. Rebecca Mercuri, also a nationally renowned expert on this subject and
a constituent of mine, asks on her website: ``Think the November 5, 2002 US
General Election went smoothly? Use your favorite Web engine and search for
the words `election' and `glitch'--a recent scan on Google News turned up
hundreds of disturbing press reports.'' Not all of these reported troubles
were in Florida. They were in Texas, Alabama, Nevada, Georgia, California,
South Carolina, Nebraska, and New Jersey. Voter News Service (VNS), the agency
that provides exit poll data that might have been used as a cross-check
against computerized returns, was coincidentally knocked out of service by an
unidentified `massive computer glitch' on Election Day as well. Many of the
election problems (including those at VNS) occurred in spite of hundreds of
millions of dollars (soon to be billions) spent on new equipment.
- In the 2002 election, brand new computer voting systems used in Florida
lost over 100,000 votes due to a software error. In New Jersey, several voting
irregularities have been reported and, in one instance, a mainframe computer
deployed to rapidly tally election results broke down entirely and had to be
replaced in the last minute by bookkeepers using adding machines. In fact, in
the 2000 election, it was also reported that in an election in South Brunswick
in my congressional district, one new touch-screen machine simply did not
record any votes at all for one Republican candidate and one Democratic
candidate. The manufacturer was quoted in the Washington Post as saying ``no
votes were lost--they were just never registered.'' The election officials in
charge were quoted as saying ``it didn't matter whether the fault was the
voters'' or the machine's, the expected votes were gone.''
- In Georgia, the entire state voted on 22,000 brand new touch-screen
machines purchased in 2001 at a cost of $54 million. The Washington Post
reported that when used in the November 2002 general election, ``some people
touched one candidate's name on the screen and saw another candidate's name
appear as their choice. Voters who were paying attention had a chance to
correct the error before finalizing their vote, but those who weren't did
not.'' It is also disturbing to note that immediately prior to the election, a
``patch'' (a modification to the voting machines'' software program) was
installed on the new machines. Although the patch reportedly ``was checked
before it was installed,'' it also reportedly was not checked by election or
certification officials. Nonetheless, the official who oversaw the statewide
upgrade in Georgia declared that the voters were happy with how the system
operated.
- Maryland also installed new touch screen machines in five counties that
were first used in the November 2002 general election. Again, the election
official who oversaw the purchase of the new equipment was reported in the
Washington Post as saying ``the system performed flawlessly in two statewide
elections. The public has a lot of confidence in it, and they love it.'' But,
as Professor David Dill observes, ``I'm not concerned with elections that are
a mess. I'm concerned about elections that appear to go smoothly, and no one
knows that it was all messed up inside the machine.'' A Maryland reporter
wrote an article on exactly that danger, immediately after the November 2002
election, using the incident in which the computer betting system used in the
Breeder's Cup Race was tampered with as a cautionary and analogous example.
- Not all election officials want to rely on voting technology that produces
no voterverified record. Warren Slocum, Chief Elections Officer &
Assessor-County ClerkRecorder for San Mateo County, California actively and
enthusiastically endorses the use of voting equipment that produces a
voter-verified paper trail. He says, ``the most naive argument against a paper
trail is that the machines are accurate and tested properly before the
election. It is argued that we don't need to worry about hackers, Trojan
Horses or programming mistakes.... Surprisingly, some elections professionals
say that touchscreen voting systems can be trusted. But when voters are given
the choice, most say `absolutely not.' And the computer scientists who have
studied this issue say no way.''
- Across the country, in growing numbers, people are studying and reading
about electronic voting and saying--``wait a minute .... ``
- With the 2004 election around the corner and states lining up to buy new
computerized voting machines, Congress needs to act immediately before it's
too late. We need to
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make
sure that voters receive a physical, paper verification of their votes. After
all, voting should not be an act of faith. It should be an act of record.
- That is why I am introducing this bill--- The Voter Confidence and
Increased Accessibility Act of 2003 --- to amend HAVA to require a
voter-verified record for all votes cast in federal elections. Under my bill,
funds expended under HAVA will be utilized in a manner that ensures that this
minimum standard of voter protection will be built into computer voting
systems before the next general election.
- Key provisions of my bill include:
- 1) A requirement that all voting systems produce a voter-verified paper
record for use in manual audits. A system using optical scanning of cards
marked by the voters is one acceptable version. For those using the
increasingly popular direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines (such
as `touch-screen' machines), this requirement means those machines would print
a receipt that each voter would verify as accurate and deposit into a lockbox
at the polling station for later use in a recount. States would have until
November 2003 to request additional funds to meet this requirement.
- (2) A ban on the use of undisclosed software and wireless communications
devices in voting systems.
- (3) A requirement that all voting systems meet these increased standards
of protection in time for the general election in November 2004. Jurisdictions
anticipating that their new computer systems may not be able to meet this
deadline will be able to use a paper system, as an interim measure and at
federal expense, in the November 2004 election.
- (4) A requirement that electronic voting systems be provided for persons
with disabilities by January 1, 2006--one year earlier than currently required
by HAVA. Like the voting systems used by persons without disabilities, those
used by disabled voters must also provide a mechanism for voter-verification,
though not necessarily a paper trail. Jurisdictions unable to meet this
requirement by the deadline must give disabled voters the option to use the
interim paper system with the assistance of an aide of their choosing.
- (5) A requirement of mandatory surprise recounts in 0.5 percent of
domestic jurisdictions and 0.5 percent of overseas jurisdictions.